United Bhd. Similarly, statutory programs or regulations that directly or indirectly support, or establish guidelines for, an entity's operations are not federal financial assistance.
Herman, 60 F. Savings of America, F. Ohio Mortgage lender subject to federal banking laws does not receive federal financial assistance. Hargrove, F. Furthermore, programs "owned and operated" by the federal government, such as the air traffic control system, do not constitute federal financial assistance.
Delta Airlines, F. It also should be noted that while contracts of guaranty and insurance may constitute federal financial assistance, Title IX specifically states that it does not apply to contracts of insurance or guaranty. See 20 U. Croghan Colonial Bank, 89 F. But see Moore v. Sun Bank, F. Procurement contracts also are not considered federal financial assistance. DeVargas v.
Hotsy Corp. Iowa procurement contract by company with GSA to provide supplies is not federal financial assistance ; Hamilton v. Illinois Cent. A distinction must be made between procurement contracts at fair market value and subsidies; the former is not federal financial assistance although the latter is.
Jacobson, F. Martin Marietta Corp. As described in Jacobson and followed in DeVargas, there need not be a detailed analysis of whether a contract is at fair market value, but instead a focus on whether the government intended to provide a subsidy to the contractor.
DeVargas, F. In DeVargas, a Department of Energy contract, issued through a competitive bidding process after a determination that a private entity could provide the service in a less costly manner, evidenced no intention to provide a subsidy to the contractor. Finally, Title IX does not apply to direct, unconditional assistance to ultimate beneficiaries, the intended class of private citizens receiving federal aid.
Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, F. A "recipient" is an entity that receives federal financial assistance and that operates "an education program or activity," and is thus subject to Title IX.
The Title IX common rule provides as follows:. The term recipient means any State or political subdivision thereof, or any instrumentality of a State or political subdivision thereof, any public or private agency, institution, or organization, or other entity, or any person, to whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through another recipient and that operates an education program or activity that receives such assistance, including any subunit, successor, assignee, or transferee thereof.
Several aspects of the plain language of the regulations should be noted. First, a recipient may be a public e. Second, Title IX does not apply to the federal government. Therefore, a federal agency cannot be considered a "recipient" within the meaning of Title IX. Third, there may be more than one recipient in a program of federal financial assistance; that is, a primary recipient e. Fifth, as discussed in detail below, there is a distinction between a recipient and a beneficiary. Finally, although not addressed in the regulations, a recipient may receive federal assistance either directly from the federal government or indirectly through a third party, who is not necessarily another recipient.
For example, schools are indirect recipients when they accept payments from students who directly receive federal financial aid.
Direct Relationship. The clearest means of identifying a "recipient" of federal financial assistance covered by Title IX is to determine whether the entity has voluntarily entered into a direct relationship with the federal government and receives federal assistance under a condition or assurance of compliance with Title IX. It is important to note that, by signing an assurance, the recipient is committing itself to complying with nondiscrimination mandates. In this scenario, the recipient has a direct relationship with the funding agency and, therefore, is subject to the requirements of Title IX.
While showing that the entity directly receives a federal grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty is the easiest means of identifying a Title IX recipient, this direct cash flow does not describe the full reach of Title IX. Indirect Recipient. A recipient may receive funds either directly or indirectly.
Grove City College, U. Although the money is paid directly to the students, the universities and other educational institutions are the indirect recipients.
In Grove City College, the Supreme Court found that there was no basis to create a distinction not made by Congress regarding funding paid directly to or received indirectly by a recipient. In reaching its conclusion, the Court considered the congressional intent and legislative history of the statute in question to identify the intended recipient. The Court found that the Education Amendments, of which Title IX is a part, are "replete with statements evincing Congress' awareness that the student assistance programs established by the Amendments would significantly aid colleges and universities.
Finally, the Court distinguished student aid programs that are "designed to assist" educational institutions and that allow such institutions the option of participation in such programs, from other general welfare programs where individuals are free to spend the payments without limitation.
In contrast, as subsequently explained by the Supreme Court in Paralyzed Veterans, it is essential to distinguish aid that flows indirectly to a recipient from aid to a recipient that reaches a beneficiary. While Grove City stands for the proposition that Title IX coverage extends to Congress' intended recipient, whether receiving the aid directly or indirectly, it does not stand for the proposition that federal coverage follows the aid past the recipient to those who merely benefit from the aid.
Smith, U. Transferees and Assignees. Agency regulations and assurances often include specific statements on the application of Title IX to successors, transferees, assignees, and contractors. In the case of Federal financial assistance extended to provide real property or structures thereon, such assurance shall obligate the recipient, or in the case of a subsequent transfer, the transferee, for the period during which the real property or structures are used to provide an education program or activity Furthermore, Title IX regulations provide that land originally acquired through a program receiving federal financial assistance must include a covenant binding on subsequent purchasers or transferees that requires nondiscrimination for as long as the land is used for the original or a similar purpose for which the federal assistance is extended.
Many programs have two recipients. The primary recipient directly receives the federal financial assistance. The primary recipient then distributes the federal assistance to a subrecipient to carry out a program. Both the primary recipient and subrecipient must conform their actions to Title IX and other nondiscrimination laws. Contractor and Agent. A recipient may not absolve itself of its Title IX and other nondiscrimination obligations by hiring a contractor or agent to perform or deliver assistance to beneficiaries.
Agency regulations consistently state that prohibitions against discriminatory conduct, whether intentional or through sex neutral means with an unjustified disparate impact, apply to a recipient, whether committed "directly or through contractual or other arrangements.
One also should evaluate the agency's assurances or certifications; such documents can provide an independent basis to seek enforcement. For example, the assurance for the Office of Justice Programs, within the Department of Justice, states, inter alia,.
Recipient v. Finally, in analyzing whether an entity is a recipient, it is necessary to distinguish a recipient from a beneficiary.
According to the Supreme Court, the Title IX regulations issued by the Department of Education "make[s] clear that Title IX coverage is not triggered when an entity merely benefits from federal funding. In NCAA v. This showing without more is insufficient to trigger Title IX coverage. The Court noted that the definition of a recipient under Title IX regulations follows the "teaching of Grove City and Paralyzed Veterans: Entities that receive federal assistance, whether directly or through an intermediary, are recipients within the meaning of Title IX; entities that only benefit economically from federal assistance are not.
Beneficiaries, however, do not enter into any formal contract or agreement or sign an assurance with the federal government where compliance with Title VI or Title IX is a condition of receiving the assistance. In almost any major federal program, Congress may intend to benefit a large class of persons, yet it may do so by funding - that is, extending federal financial assistance to - a limited class of recipients.
Title IX was meant to cover only those situations where federal funding is given to a non-federal entity which, in turn, provides financial assistance to the ultimate beneficiary, or disburses federal assistance to another recipient for ultimate distribution to a beneficiary.
See Grove City U. In Paralyzed Veterans, a Section case decided under Department of Transportation regulations, the Court held that commercial airlines that used airports and gained an advantage from the capital improvements and construction at airports were beneficiaries, and not recipients, under the airport improvement program. The airport operators, in contrast, directly receive the federal financial assistance for the airport construction.
The Court examined the program statutes and concluded:. Congress recognized a need to improve airports in order to benefit a wide variety of persons and entities, all of them classified together as beneficiaries.
Congress did not set up a system where passengers were the primary or direct beneficiaries, and all others benefitted by the Acts are indirect recipients of the financial assistance to airports The statute covers only those who receive the aid, but does not extend as far as those who benefit from it Congress tied the regulatory authority to those programs or activities that receive federal financial assistance. Title IX prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of sex in education programs or activities.
As noted in the Introduction, however, the primary focus of this Title IX Manual is on education programs or activities conducted outside traditional educational institutions.
As discussed in Chapter I, the CRRA amended Title IX, Title VI, Section , and the Age Discrimination Act by adding an explicit and expansive definition of "program or activity" that encompasses "all of the operations of" a covered entity, any part of which receives federal financial assistance, in order to establish the principle of institution-wide coverage. As explained below, outside the context of traditional educational institutions, a fact-specific inquiry is required to determine which portions of a covered program or activity are educational, and thus covered by Title IX.
In light of the broad sweep envisioned for Title IX, and the expansive notion of institution-wide coverage mandated by the CRRA, such inquiries must be made as broadly as possible. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of Before examining the question of what constitutes a covered education program or activity under Title IX, as amended by the CRRA, it is helpful to take a closer look at the CRRA and the expansive definition of "program" and "program or activity" enacted by this amendment.
For the purposes of this chapter, the term "program or activity" and "program" mean all of the operations of B the entity of such state or local government that distributes such assistance and each such department or agency and each other State or local government entity to which the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local government;.
B the entire plant or other comparable, geographically separate facility to which Federal financial assistance is extended, in the case of any other corporation, partnership, private organization, or sole proprietorship; or.
Since passage of the CRRA, courts have consistently held that the receipt of federal funds results in entity-wide coverage under these statutes. Alabama, F. Meaning of "education program or activity". However, by defining only "program or activity," the CRRA did not directly address the question of how to interpret the modifier "education" for purposes of Title IX coverage.
As a result, coverage under Title IX involves an issue of statutory interpretation that does not arise for the other three civil rights statutes, namely: to what extent does "education" provide a limitation on the concept of institution-wide coverage embodied in the CRRA? The legislative history of the CRRA reveals that some members of Congress struggled with this very issue.
If a private hospital corporation is extended federal assistance for its emergency rooms, all the operations of the hospital, including for example, the operating rooms, the pediatrics department, admissions, discharge offices, etc.
Since Title IX is limited to education programs or activities, it would apply only to the students and employees of education programs operated by the hospital, if any. Covered "education programs or activities". Of course, ordinary rules of statutory construction require that meaning be given to all phrases of a statute. Heckler, U. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, "It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that courts should give effect, if possible, to every word that Congress has used in a statute.
Thus, in determining the proper scope of coverage for Title IX, as amended by the CRRA, it is important to give meaning to both the modifier "education" and the phrase "program or activity. In light of these considerations, a fact-specific inquiry is necessary to determine what constitutes a covered "education program or activity. In conducting such factual inquiries, it is important to remember that determinations as to what constitutes a covered education program must be made as broadly as possible.
This principle is consistent with both the broad sweep of coverage originally envisioned for Title IX as well as the expansive notion of institution-wide coverage mandated by the CRRA. Notably, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that it is appropriate to conduct just such a fact-specific inquiry in order to determine the proper scope of coverage under Title IX.
In Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F. Jeldness, 30 F. Both of these statutes were designed to eradicate sex-based discrimination in education programs operated by recipients of federal financial assistance, and all determinations as to the scope of coverage under these statutes must be made in a manner consistent with this important congressional mandate.
Discriminatory Conduct. Title IX was modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of and they both share a common purpose: to ensure that public funds derived from all the people are not utilized in ways that encourage, subsidize, permit, or result in prohibited discrimination against some of the people.
Title IX, like Title VI, recognizes three general types of prohibited discrimination: 1 disparate treatment, 2 disparate impact, and 3 retaliation. Any effective and meaningful administrative enforcement program under Title IX must be prepared to address all three. Disparate Treatment. Disparate treatment 33 refers to actions that treat similarly situated persons differently on the basis of a prohibited classification.
In the case of Title IX, the prohibited classification is sex. Under the disparate treatment theory of discrimination, the core question is whether a recipient, through its officials, has treated people differently on the basis of sex.
To establish disparate treatment, the fundamental task is to show that similarly situated individuals were treated differently because of, or on the basis of their sex. This does not mean, however, that the evidence must show "bad faith, ill will or any evil motive on the part of the [recipient].
For example, many statutory or administrative schemes that illegally discriminate on the basis of sex were created or were subsequently justified as efforts to address the special needs of a particular sex. Evidence of discriminatory intent may be direct or circumstantial and may be found from various sources, including statements by decision makers, the historical background of the events in issue, the sequence of events leading to the decision in issue, a departure from standard procedure e.
Direct proof of discriminatory intent is often unavailable. Green, U. Applying the McDonnell Douglas principles to a Title IX claim, the investigating agency must first determine whether the case file raises an inference of discrimination, i.
The elements of a prima facie case may vary depending on the facts of the complaint, but such elements often include the following:. If the case file contains sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the investigating agency must then determine whether the recipient can articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.
In other words, the evidence must support a finding that the reason articulated by the recipient was not the true reason for the challenged action, and that the real reason was discrimination based on sex. Similar principles may be used to analyze claims that a recipient has engaged in a "pattern or practice" of unlawful discrimination.
It is also important to remember that some claims of intentional discrimination may involve the use of policies or practices that explicitly classify individuals on the basis of sex.
Such "classifications" may constitute unlawful discrimination. For example, the Supreme Court held in a Title VII case that a policy that required female employees to make larger contributions to a pension fund than male employees created an unlawful classification based on sex. Most such policies will be deemed to violate Title IX assuming the actions occurred in an education or training program unless the recipient can articulate a lawful justification for classifying people on the basis of sex.
Disparate Impact. In contrast to disparate treatment, which focuses on the intent to cause sex-based results, disparate impact focuses on the consequences of a facially sex-neutral policy or practice. Under this theory of discrimination, the core inquiry focuses on the results of the action taken, rather than the underlying intent. Indeed, "intent" is not an element in the disparate impact analysis.
Under the disparate impact theory, a recipient violates agency regulations by using a neutral procedure or practice that has a disparate impact on protected individuals, and such practice lacks a substantial legitimate justification. In a disparate impact case, the focus of the investigation concerns the consequences of the recipient's practices, rather than the recipient's intent. If the evidence establishes a prima facie case, the investigating agency must then determine whether the recipient can articulate a "substantial legitimate justification" for the challenged practice.
If the recipient can make such a showing, the inquiry then turns to whether there are any "equally effective alternative practices" that would result in less adverse impact. Courts have often found Title VI disparate impact violations in cases where recipients utilize policies or practices that result in the provision of fewer services or benefits, or inferior services or benefits, to members of a protected group.
A similar outcome should result under Title IX where sex is the basis for the differences in impact. For example, in Sharif v. New York State Educ. Riles, F. In evaluating a potential disparate impact violation, it is important to examine whether there is a substantial legitimate justification for the challenged practice and whether there exists an alternative practice that is comparably effective with less of a disparate impact. The MTA and the State identified several factors favoring a higher subsidization of the commuter lines.
By encouraging suburban residents not to drive into the City, subsidization of the commuter rails minimizes congestion and pollution levels associated with greater use of automobiles in the city; encourages business to locate in the City; and provides additional fare-paying passengers to the City subway and bus system.
In these respects and in others, subsidizing the commuter rails may bring material benefits to the minority riders of the subway and bus system. The district court dismissed such factors, concluding that the MTA board did not explicitly consider them before voting on the NYCTA and commuter line fare increases.
That finding is largely irrelevant to whether such considerations would justify the relative allocation of total funds to the NYCTA and the commuter lines emphasis added. Similarly, in Young by and through Young v. Montgomery County Ala Bd. Both of these justifications are substantial and legitimate because they evince a genuine attempt by the Board of Education to improve the quality of education offered in [the] County.
A right cannot exist in the absence of some credible and effective mechanism for its enforcement and enforcement cannot occur in the absence of a beneficiary class willing and able to assert the right. The Title IX regulations incorporate the requirement in the Title VI regulations, which provides that "[n]o recipient or other person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by [Title VI], or because he has made a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this subpart.
Retaliation protections are designed to preserve the integrity and effectiveness of the enforcement process itself. Because of this purpose, the merits of any underlying complaint of sex discrimination are irrelevant in assessing a retaliation complaint.
Moreover, protected activities include more than filing complaints seeking a vindication of personal rights. Retaliation claims have their own remedial purpose in that they seek to ensure that rights created under a federal civil rights statute do not go unenforced for fear of adverse official reaction. The recipient thereafter subjected the person to adverse action, treatment or conditions; and.
There is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action, treatment or conditions. Once a prima facie case of retaliation is established, the investigating agency must then determine whether the recipient can articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action.
A showing of pretext may be sufficient to support an inference of retaliation if the fact finder concludes that retaliation was the real purpose of the action. Employment Discrimination. Title IX has proven a helpful vehicle in addressing sex-based employment discrimination in educational programs and activities. Scope of Coverage. By way of summary, Title VI is broader as to the types of programs or activities covered i.
Specifically, Title VI prohibits employment discrimination on the part of a recipient only where a purpose of the federal financial assistance received is to provide employment.
Because Title IX does not contain limiting language as does Title VI, the courts have concluded that Title IX reaches employment discrimination in the educational programs or activities of recipients without limitation. Consistent with this construction, most federal agencies have joined in adopting final regulations implementing Title IX which broadly prohibit "discrimination in employment, or recruitment, consideration, or selection therefor, whether full-time or part-time, under any education program or activity operated by a recipient that receives Federal financial assistance.
Relationship to Title VII. Substantive Standards. In resolving employment actions, the courts have generally held that the substantive standards and policies developed under Title VII to define discriminatory employment conduct apply with equal force to employment actions brought under Title IX.
The use of case law and policies developed under Title VII is similarly appropriate in the administrative setting. In conducting investigations alleging employment discrimination, agencies shall consider Title VII case law and EEOC Guidelines, 29 CFR parts , unless inapplicable, in determining whether a recipient of Federal financial assistance has engaged in an unlawful employment practice.
Procedural Standards. The Supreme Court has yet to explicitly decide whether the far more detailed and comprehensive procedural requirements of Title VII are applicable to claims of employment discrimination brought under Title IX. The lower courts that have faced this question are divided. One view treats Title IX as an independent basis for finding discrimination based on the substantive standards of Title VII, but divorced from its administrative requirements.
The other view is that the more focused and detailed enforcement scheme of Title VII preempts Title IX in the area of employment discrimination. Individuals can use both statutes to attack the same violations.
Of course, this view is important only for individuals wishing to file private rights of action in courts. Federal agencies responsible for investigating Title IX complaints alleging employment discrimination must follow the procedures discussed in Section B 5 of this chapter. Prohibited Employment Practices. As noted above, the Title IX common rule specifically incorporates the disparate impact standard as part of its prohibitions against sex-based employment discrimination.
Where the Title IX common rule does not address some aspect of the employment relationship or where more detailed guidance is required beyond that provided by the Title IX common rule and if there is no relevant guidance issued by the Department of Education interpreting its Title IX regulations , agency officials should review and apply the applicable standards and policies developed under Title VII.
Special Considerations. Two areas raise special considerations requiring specific discussion. In some cases, recipients may attempt to modify their obligations under Title IX in an effort to comply with other legal or contractual obligations. In other cases, recipients may attempt to create sex-sensitive criteria for employment in specific types of positions.
Competing Legal Obligations. These competing obligations might result from state or local laws or find their source in third party labor or service contracts. They could include, for example, limitations or restrictions on the number of hours worked or types of jobs filled by women. In pertinent part, the Title IX common rule provides that:. Thus, in cases of conflict between the requirements of Title IX and obligations imposed by local law or third party contracts, Title IX controls.
If an entity does not want to follow Title IX, it is free to simply decline federal financial assistance but it still may be subject to Title VII. Among those standards is the recognition that, in extremely limited circumstances, sex may constitute a bona fide occupational qualification "BFOQ".
A recipient may take action otherwise prohibited. In evaluating claims that sex-based job qualifications are justified as a BFOQ, agency investigative officials should consult and apply the standards and case law developed under Title VII with respect to this narrow exception. Complaints received by federal agencies that allege sex-based employment discrimination should be processed in conformity with the "Procedures for Complaints of Employment Discrimination Filed Against Recipients of Federal Financial Assistance.
Under the Joint Complaint Procedures, complaints are deemed filed with the EEOC as of the date the complaint was received by the sister federal agency. Moreover, the Joint Complaint Procedures require that the recipient be advised of receipt of the employment complaint within 10 days.
In those cases where the agency does not have jurisdiction over the employment complaint i. Where the complaint alleges employment discrimination over which both the agency and EEOC have parallel authority i. In the case of a joint complaint alleging a pattern or practice of employment discrimination, however, the Joint Complaint Procedures reverse the referral presumption.
In these cases, the Procedures contemplate that the agency will retain investigative and enforcement authority over the complaint absent "special circumstances" warranting a referral to the EEOC. Finally, where the complaint alleges discrimination in both the provision of educational services and employment, the Joint Complaint Procedures again direct that, absent special circumstances, the agency should retain its authority over the complaint rather than refer the matter to the EEOC.
The rationale behind the referral rules set out in the Joint Complaint Procedures is not difficult to discern. However, complaints alleging a pattern or practice of employment discrimination or discrimination in the provision of educational services, implicate the core integrity of the educational program or activity of the recipient of federal financial assistance.
In these cases, logic and the greater expertise of the funding agency regarding the core purposes of the federal financial assistance argue in favor of its retaining jurisdiction over these broader complaints. Specific Provisions. Under the Title IX common rule, as a general matter, in providing any aid, benefit, or service, a recipient may not, on the basis of sex:.
Under the Title IX common rule, a recipient may not apply different rules or regulations, impose different fees or requirements, or offer different services or benefits related to housing. However, a recipient may provide separate housing on the basis of sex if such housing is both proportionate in quantity to the number of students of each sex applying for the housing and comparable in quality and cost to the student.
However, a recipient may render such assistance to an agency, organization, or person that provides all or part of such housing to students of only one sex. Under the Title IX common rule, recipients of federal financial assistance must not discriminate in providing facilities on the basis of sex. A recipient may provide separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex.
However, such facilities provided to one sex must be comparable to the facilities provided to the other sex. A recipient generally may not provide an education program or activity separately on the basis of sex or require or refuse participation by an individual of a certain sex in courses such as health, physical education, industrial, business, vocational, technical, home economics, music, and adult education courses on the basis of sex.
However, in a prison setting, penal necessities may require educational programs and activities to be offered separately on the basis of sex. While separate courses may be offered in a prison setting, penal necessity is not a defense for failing to provide equality of access to comparable educational programs to male and female inmates. Under the Title IX common rule, a recipient may not discriminate against any person on the basis of sex in the counseling or guidance of students or applicants for admission.
Specifically, in appraising or counseling students, a recipient must not use different testing or other materials on the basis of sex or use materials that permit or require different treatment of students on the basis of sex. Such different materials may be used, however, where they cover the same occupational interest areas and their use is shown to be essential to eliminate sex bias.
Finally, where a recipient finds that a particular class contains a substantially disproportionate number of individuals of one sex, the recipient must take such action as is necessary to assure itself that such disproportion is not the result of discrimination on the basis of sex in counseling or appraisal materials or by counselors.
When a recipient provides financial assistance to any student participating in an educational program or activity, the recipient must ensure that it does not provide different types or amounts of assistance, limit eligibility for such assistance, apply different criteria, or otherwise discriminate in the provision of financial assistance on the basis of sex. See 65 Fed. Although recipients are allowed to administer or assist in administering specific sex-restricted scholarships, fellowships, or other forms of financial assistance to students through a domestic or foreign will, trust, bequest, or similar instrument, the Title IX regulations require that the overall effect of such sex-restricted financial assistance not discriminate on the basis of sex.
To ensure compliance with Title IX regulations, recipients must develop and use procedures that select students to be awarded financial assistance in a nondiscriminatory manner and not on the basis of availability of funds restricted to members of a particular sex. This means that a recipient cannot deny a scholarship or other financial assistance to an individual because the available monies are restricted to members of a particular sex.
For example, recipients must select in a sex neutral fashion who is eligible for assistance. They are than free to allocate assistance to those selected individuals from among sex restricted scholarships.
However, they cannot deny assistance to selected individuals because scholarships or other financial assistance is sex restricted. A recipient who assists any agency, organization, or person in making employment available to its students must ensure that the employment is not provided in a discriminatory manner on the basis of sex.
If the agency, organization, or person is offering employment in a discriminatory manner, the recipient must not assist such an agency, organization, or person by providing its employment service.
Under the Title IX common rule, a recipient must not discriminate on the basis of sex in providing health and insurance benefits or services. Specifically, the provision of such benefits and services to students must meet the same requirements as outlined in the employee provisions of the common rule. However, these provisions do not prohibit a recipient from providing any benefit or service that may be used by a different proportion of students of one sex than of the other, including family planning services.
However, any recipient that provides full coverage health service must provide gynecological care. This bill dies in committee before reaching the House floor. July 21, Congress reviews and approves Title IX regulations and rejects the following resolutions and bills that had been advanced in an attempt to disprove the athletics regulations 2 :.
Title IX federal regulations are issued in the area of athletics. High schools and colleges are given three years, and elementary schools one year, to comply. The suit would be dismissed in July 15, Sens. Tower, Dewey F. Bartlett, and Roman Hruska introduce S. The bill dies in committee before reaching the Senate floor.
July 21, Deadline for high schools and colleges to comply with Title IX athletics requirements. May 4, The U. February 28, Grove City v.
Bell limits the scope of Title IX , effectively taking away coverage of athletics except for athletic scholarships. September 6, Haffer v. Temple University Title IX athletics lawsuit won by plaintiff female athletes gives new, stronger direction to athletic departments regarding their budgets, scholarships, and participation rates of male and female athletes.
April 2, Valerie M. February 26, In Franklin v. As a result, in there were just 30, women participating in NCAA sports, as opposed to , men. Title IX was designed to correct those imbalances. In high school, the number of girl athletes has increased from just , in to more than 2. In college, the number has grown from 30, to more than , In addition, Title IX is credited with decreasing the dropout rate of girls from high school and increasing the number of women who pursue higher education and complete college degrees.
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