Who said shock and awe




















CrossRef Google Scholar. Robert A. Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales Jr. Seymour M. Thomas E. Nicholas E. Kevin M. Woods, Michael R. Pease, and Mark E. James R. Jeffrey H. He added that the allies would work to search for, capture, and drive out terrorists who had found safe harbor in Iraq, as well as to deliver humanitarian relief to the Iraqi people.

Iraqi leaders are "starting to lose control of their country," Rumsfeld announced on Friday. He added that the confusion among Iraqi generals was growing, and he speculated that those close to the Iraqi leader would question where they stood in terms of their support for Saddam.

Rumsfeld also advised Iraqi military officials not to obey orders to use weapons of mass destruction, not to use innocent people as human shields around military forces or equipment, and not to destroy oil wells or blow up dams. He said that those who did not follow this advice would be punished. The full-scale strike came just days after Iraqi President Saddam Hussein defied a hour deadline to leave the country, which President Bush imposed on March Operation Iraqi Freedom comes as a coalition effort to force Baghdad to disarm.

When Iraq lost the Gulf War, the country agreed to peace terms with the coalition that defeated Baghdad. However, it did not always cooperate with those terms. For example, Iraq was required to allow U. But Iraq kicked the inspectors out of the country in , and they did not return until the U.

Resolution demanded that Iraq give up its alleged weapons of mass destruction. The measure threatened "serious consequences" if Iraq did not disarm. It stated that Iraq was in "material breach" of Resolution - language that could have led to the U.

However, the U. Cohen, who was then Secretary of Defense. DGI on the concept of Rapid Dominance. An unnamed Pentagon official told Martin that the strategy would be Shock and Awe. Martin went for comment to Ullman, who was then a senior advisor for the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a columnist for the Washington Times. You also take the city down. By that, I mean you get rid of their power, water. In two, three, four, five days they are physically, emotionally, and psychologically exhausted.

Martin reported that not everybody in the Administration was a believer in Shock and Awe. For the next several weeks, the Shock and Awe phrase was heard periodically, mostly from television talk show guests who disagreed with it. References escalated sharply after a press breakfast on March 4 featuring Gen.

Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Sony applied for a trademark on Shock and Awe to use as the title of a video game, but dropped the application in embarrassment when it was discovered by the news media. Others sought to trademark Shock and Awe for pesticides and herbicides, barbecue sauce, and fireworks displays. Ullman made it clear he had no direct input to the war plan, but he published his views regularly in op-ed columns and he was interviewed often by both print and broadcast media.

Shock and Awe alarmed those who misinterpreted references to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The rationale is to bring intense pressure on the enemy and do minimum damage to civilian infrastructure. Major R. Owens D-N. US leaders did not join in the predictions of instant victory.

I doubt six months. It will be of a force and a scope and a scale that has been beyond what has been seen before. The Iraqi soldiers and officers must ask themselves whether they want to die fighting for a doomed regime or do they want to survive, help the Iraqi people in the liberation of their country, and play a role in a new, free Iraq. Coalition aircraft dropped millions of leaflets urging Iraqi military forces to lay down their arms.

The full air campaign began on March The spectacular bombardment the world watched on television the first night was part of a broader attack that sent 1, strike sorties against military targets in Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, and elsewhere.

What the fires and explosions seen on the skyline did not show was the extraordinary precision of the strikes and the care taken to avoid hitting the civilian population. The effect on military and government targets was ruinous.

However, it was not what the public expected, having been spun up by hundreds of stories about Shock and Awe. It did not draw the mass surrenders planners had hoped. In reality, after four days of bombing, the coalition had dropped 2, PGMs, averaging every 24 hours. Actually, the campaign at that point—whether it was Shock and Awe or something else—had broken the back of the Iraqi regime. The ground forces took Baghdad in three weeks without a major battle and meeting little effective resistance, mainly because the Republican Guard divisions in their path had been demolished by airpower.

After a few days, with the knowledge that his Army and political control of the country no longer existed, Saddam might have quit or fled the field in a matter of days or a week or two. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Michael Moseley, then the Gulf War II combined force air component commander, was of similar opinion. Some critics saw Shock and Awe as nothing more than strategic airpower wearing a new hat. Air Force doctrine recognizes as Napoleon did surprise as one of the major principles of war and lists shock as one of the products of surprise.

Doctrine further identifies strategic attack as one the functions of air and space power. In turn, strategic attack is directed at both the capability and the will of the enemy to continue the fight. Ullman and Wade in drew a distinction between Shock and Awe and doctrines of strategic attack. In , Ullman sometimes sounded as if he regarded airpower as the antithesis of the concept.

The British have a much better phrase for it: effects-based operations. Ullman was unaware, apparently, that the Air Force was preaching and practicing Effects-Based Operations long before the appearance of Shock and Awe.

In Effects-Based Operations the objective is not always destruction of the enemy. It may be to gain a specific strategic or tactical result, such as deterring, neutralizing, or halting the enemy force. Deptula, now a major general and director of plans and programs at Air Combat Command. One of his slides listed Shock and Awe as a related concept.

It was only in recent years that technology made such an approach possible. Strategic airpower, Effects-Based Operations, and Parallel Warfare have characteristics in common with Shock and Awe, but they are far from synonymous with it.

John R. They seldom work in isolation and are not successful in all circumstances—they are elements of strategy, not doctrinal principles. Strategies are specific sets of objectives, courses of action, and tools tied to a particular conflict.



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