Download free samples. Resource Examples. Click any of the example images below to view a larger version. Fact File. Student Activities. Table of Contents. Add a header to begin generating the table of contents. The nature and history of European alliance system. Establishment of alliances prior to WWI. Key Facts And Information. Patterns involved a network of treaties, agreements, and ententes were signed before Such alliances created national tensions and rivalries among nations in Europe.
An alliance can be defined as a formal, economic, military, or political agreement between two or more nations. Military alliances were and still are the most common alliances during and after World War I. Alliances usually contain pledges that if a war or an act of aggression occurs, one nation will support the other in terms of an army that is mobilising troops, weapons, and relief.
These terms are usually present in an alliance document. Moreover, alliances can also be economic terms, such as bilateral or multilateral trade agreements, investments, or even loans. It was common during the 19th and early 20th centuries for European nations to form, annul, and restructure alliances regularly.
Historical background of alliances Alliances were not a new thing in European history. For centuries, there had been ethnic, political, and territorial rivalries in Europe, and they would often, due to paranoia, lead to war. An example was France and England, who were ancient rivals, which led to open warfare several times. Another example was the relationship between France and Germany.
As France and Russia were sworn enemies, this alliance gave some of the European states some protection. Alliances prevented larger, stronger states from waging war on the smaller, weaker states. In the s, alliances were both a defence measure and a political instrument. It was not uncommon for kings and princes to form, reform, or restructure alliances in an attempt to benefit their interests. Sometimes this was just a move to isolate and starve their rivals. These alliances often did not last as they either collapsed when new leaders took over or were replaced by other alliances.
European nations either allied themselves in support of Bonaparte or rallied to defeat him. Between European leaders, seven anti-Napoleonic coalitions were formed between and After Napoleon was defeated in at Waterloo, England, European leaders strived to restore normality and achieve stability in their respective nations.
It proved successful over a short period, then began weakening in the mids. The presence of emperors and their interests, changes in administration, a series of revolutions, and rising nationalist movements where the state wanted to own everything in Germany, Italy, and other countries saw European tensions rise again and marked the beginning of rivalries.
Alliances were favoured once again as nations tried to defend and advance their interests. After the unification of Germany, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck secured a strong alliance with the great powers of Austria-Hungary and Russia. At its heyday, in the first years after the Congress of Vienna, the new consensus among the Great Powers was strong enough to make separate alliance treaties between some of them seem irrelevant.
In the s, with disputes over the future of Spain and her former colonies in Latin America and divergent intentions in the Eastern Question, Great Power relations were transformed. New alliances were forged between Britain and France and between the conservative monarchies of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The latter was perceived as a bulwark anti-revolutionary policy, the former as a cooperation of more liberal-minded cabinets.
With regard to the decline of the Ottoman Empire and its geopolitical consequences, different patterns of alignment emerged in His nephew, Napoleon III, Emperor of the French , was instrumental in the formation of an anti-Russian war coalition in The Crimean War was a decisive blow to the Vienna Settlement, although the peace treaty of Paris in reiterated the idea of a Concert of Europe.
It left Russia reeling from defeat and encouraged further revision of the international system. Alliances became important tools in the ensuing transformation of Europe. The so-called Wars of Italian Independence and of German Unification changed the map of Europe by creating new nation states.
They also left the Habsburg Monarchy and France in a much weaker position. The creation of Germany under Prussian leadership and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was the most obvious shift in the balance of power. In a series of three victorious wars, Prussia had forged the economically and militarily strong German Empire, which now held a particularly powerful position on the continent.
Ever the skillful diplomat, Bismarck was able to achieve this much, but he left a difficult legacy to his successors after his dismissal in It turned out to be particularly difficult to maintain close ties with Russia without encouraging St. Petersburg to wage a policy of expansion on the Balkans. Several times, Bismarck tried to build on the traditional pattern of anti-revolutionary cooperation between the monarchies of the Romanovs, the Hohenzollern, and the Habsburgs.
It evoked the spirit of the Holy Alliance, but would not survive the clash of interests between Austria-Hungary and Russia that developed just a few years later over the expansion of Russian influence in South East Europe and the creation of a Greater Bulgaria in the San Stefano peace treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.
The Balkan Crisis of the s and the Congress of Berlin in , at which Bismarck did not save Russia from international pressure to give up on the project of Greater Bulgaria, rattled the foundations of the cooperation between the three conservative monarchies of the Hohenzollerns, the Romanovs, and the Habsburgs. The secret alliance treaty of 7 October assured Austria-Hungary of German military assistance in case of a Russian attack on the Dual Monarchy.
Austria-Hungary also committed herself to come to the rescue of her ally in case of a Russian attack on Germany, a highly unlikely scenario. Benevolent neutrality was all they had to promise, unless France would be fighting alongside Russia. In this way, Bismarck avoided a situation in which the weaker of the allies would be able to steer the stronger one towards war. The German chancellor was not only trying to commit Vienna to close coordination of its Balkan policy with Berlin; he also hoped to make the Dual Alliance the cornerstone of cooperation in other fields and to tie the Habsburg Monarchy to the German Reich in a way reminiscent of the Holy Roman Empire.
Nevertheless, the Dual Alliance was not considered to be just another international treaty, but rather the foundation and symbol of a special relationship between the German Empire and the Dual Monarchy.
The very basis of Austro-Hungarian dualism, the dominating influence of the Germans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary, was seen as non-negotiable in Berlin, in order to keep Slav aspirations in Europe at bay. With Italy staying out of the fray in , the Dual Alliance became the nucleus of what would be called the war coalition of the Central Powers.
As in the case of Germany, the creation of Italy as a nation state had come at the expense of the Habsburg Monarchy. But unlike Germany, where the idea of uniting the German-speaking parts of Austria with the German Empire enjoyed almost no support, the vision of an Italy that included the Italian-speaking regions of the Habsburg Monarchy held considerable appeal for the Italian elites. In addition, the aspiring new — and still not very strong — Great Power Italy was vying with Austria-Hungary for control in the Adriatic.
The potential for conflict between both powers notwithstanding, Italy had reasons to cover her back while she was striving for colonial expansion in the Mediterranean.
If two or more of the Great Powers attacked one of the three alliance partners, the other two would also be required to intervene by force.
If only one Great Power forced one of the allies to resort to war, the others were obliged to keep a neutral stance, unless they decided to help militarily. Its text would be kept secret, as would the articles that were to be added in later years when the treaty was up for renewal.
This was formalized in a set of agreements brokered by Bismarck that culminated in a treaty between Great Britain and Italy in February , with Austria-Hungary in March and with Spain in May The so-called Mediterranean Entente defused conflicts between Austria-Hungary and Italy, but most importantly, it contained Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean quite successfully in the late s and early s.
In , when the Triple Alliance was to be renewed for the second time, the Austrian minister of foreign affairs suggested to the Italians that an agreement between the two allies should be included, which aimed to preserve the status quo in the Balkans and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.
In the years before, the article kept a lid on Austro-Italian rivalry in Albania. During the Italo-Turkish War of , Rome could count on the tacit support or at least acquiescence of the other Great Powers. As the Ottoman Empire, weakened by the Italian attack on its North African possessions and the ensuing war, came close to collapse in in its fight against the Balkan League, which had been forged by Russian diplomacy, the Great Powers set up the London conference.
The Concert of Europe was meant to contain the shockwaves and to help find viable solutions to territorial disputes when the spoils of war were divided up. The Triple Alliance was renewed for the last time in December , in the wake of the First Balkan War, with tensions between the Great Powers at crisis level. In Austria-Hungary, suspicions of Italian duplicity were widespread.
Rivalry between both allies in the Adriatic and fear of Italian plans to grab Habsburg territory fueled anxieties and inspired military build-up and heavy-handed policing along the border. A naval armaments race between the allies ensued in the early s that would slow down only on the eve of war. Whereas the alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary had been pivotal to Italian efforts to become a modern, respected great power in the s and most of the s, in the early 20 th century, ties to Vienna and Berlin had become a matter of weighing strategic opportunities.
Italy was not the only one about to jump ship and seek closer relations with Britain, France, and Russia; Romania was, as well. In both cases, Austria-Hungary stood in the way of the possibility of expanding influence and gaining territories in the Balkans. Both in Italy and in Romania, the hope of annexing parts of the Habsburg Monarchy that had a majority population of co-nationals started to gain more traction among publicists and politicians. Fears of such a policy among the political elites in Vienna and Budapest were not without justification, but greatly exaggerated.
Nevertheless, those fears fed into a growing sense of instability and imminent threat to the very existence of the Habsburg Monarchy. By , the future of the Triple Alliance seemed to be in question, but many decision-makers in Vienna and in Berlin who started the July Crisis hoped to keep the Triple Alliance — including Romania — together in case of a European war, or at least to be able to count on Italian and Romanian neutrality.
Until the late s, the French Republic held a rather isolated position among the Great Powers. Colonial disputes with Britain and Italy played a role, but so did the perception of France as a standard-bearer of revolution. Republicanism and revolution were considered deadly threats to Europe in general and to Russia in particular, especially by the tsar and his government.
French politicians sensed an opening for closer relations with the only strategic partner left on the continent that might help to counter Germany. The detention of Russian anarchists in France made the republic more palatable to the tsar. Financial support was something the French Republic had to offer, but it also had sizable military capabilities.
The visit of a French naval squadron to the Russian harbor of Kronstadt and a Russian return visit to Toulon in made the realignment public. It was the French who insisted on a written agreement. In August , the two general staffs signed a military convention that would be endorsed by an exchange of diplomatic notes. Thus, on 4 January , the agreement between the general staffs gained the status of an alliance treaty. Just as in the case of the Dual Alliance, the Franco-Russian alliance was a defensive one.
Russia promised support with all her forces available in case of an attack on France by Germany or by Italy with German assistance.
Unlike the Dual Alliance or the Triple Alliance treaties, the Franco-Russian agreement was more specific in terms of military aspects. Article 2 regulated mobilization and deployment:. In Article 3, the text even mentioned troop numbers and defined the basic strategic concept of coalition warfare :. Little wonder that Article 4 called for close cooperation between the two general staffs in order to allow for coordinated campaigns in case of war.
Throughout the following years, the allies discussed strategy, operations, and logistics. France supported armaments and the construction of strategic railways in Russia. At the time, Russo-Austrian relations had taken a turn for the better and a French conquest of Alsace-Lorraine in the context of a general war seemed farfetched.
After she had suffered defeat at the hands of the Japanese in Manchuria and at Tsushima in , and in the wake of revolutionary turmoil in , Russia needed to rebuild her military capabilities. French support and rapid economic modernization allowed for fast rearmament, but not fast enough to save Russia from humiliation in , when a German ultimatum forced St. Petersburg to abandon Serbia in the conflict with Austria-Hungary over the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Compared to the late s and early s, British policy had changed profoundly under Edward Grey , who had become foreign secretary in After three years of fierce fighting, the war in South Africa inspired dystopian visions of decline in Britain.
To protect the empire and the United Kingdom, alliances would be useful, or even necessary. On 8 April , Foreign Secretary Lord Lansdowne and the French ambassador to London signed a declaration that was meant to resolve conflicts concerning colonial interests in Morocco, Egypt , and other territories overseas.
What initially looked like a low-level deal about more or less far-flung places marked the beginning of a major realignment among the Great Powers. Withstanding German pressure with regard to the Moroccan Question in and , the Entente Cordiale proved its mettle as a tool in crisis diplomacy. It was no formal alliance and therefore neither a casus foederis nor a military commitment were part of the agreement.
Nevertheless, army leaders on both sides of the Channel gave thought to coalition warfare against the Triple Alliance on the continent. In secret negotiations, they agreed on a British Expeditionary Force of , to , troops, to be deployed alongside the French army. Revealed to the British cabinet only in , the military plans still did not have the same binding character as the Franco-Russian Alliance. In addition, the naval agreement between Britain and France in would provide for burden-sharing between both fleets, with the French focusing on the Mediterranean and the British being in charge of the North Sea and the Channel.
Grey inherited the Entente Cordiale from his predecessor, but he would give it broader significance. This was in line with efforts to improve relations with Russia, not least to safeguard British interests in India and the Persian Gulf. In a long-term perspective, Russia seemed much more of a challenge to the British Empire than Germany, and from this point of view, it made perfect sense to foster close relations with her.
The convention was the capstone of a new pattern of cooperation between France, Britain, and Russia, which was called the Triple Entente by contemporaries. As in the case of the Triple Alliance, it was not easy to foresee the coherence and effectiveness of the Triple Entente in the event of a major European war.
The possibility that another revolution in Russia might overturn the balance of power could not be dismissed. And it was quite unclear how Britain would act in case of a European war, not only because of divisions in the cabinet, but also because of the unpredictable mood of parliament and of the British public. By , both the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente had become established features of international relations.
The public had become used to debating Great Power politics in Europe in this mould. The same held true for diplomats, officials, and ministers. Scrutinizing the coherence of both alliance systems was a common topic in memoranda and official correspondence, but also in letters and diaries of experts and decision-makers.
Whenever a crisis arose in international relations, the current situation of alliances and possible repercussions on their future would be considered. This pattern of thought did not necessarily lead to an escalation of crises. Alliances could even restrain the assertiveness of a Great Power in a conflict scenario. In this respect, alliances did not necessarily hasten the sequence of crises that characterized European Great Power politics from until But from the First Moroccan Crisis in onwards, all the major conflicts that dominated the agenda of diplomats and politicians over the course of a decade were perceived as tests of the stability of alliances.
To be sure, not being isolated and having reliable partners among the Great Powers was important for prestige. This mattered, because any gain or loss of prestige would not go unnoticed by the public at home and decision-makers abroad.
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